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LAw WRITERS AND nm CouRTS. By Clyde E. Jacobs. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 1954. Pp. x, 223. $3.50. 
To what extent do the writers of legal treatises-the "publicists"-influence 
the courts in the decision of controversies before them? The author of this mono-
graph has undertaken this difficult quest with respect to two principles (liberty 
of contract and the public purpose requirement of taxation) and three text 
writers of the post-Civil War period. 
The first, Thomas M. Cooley, was chosen by the Michigan Senate to codify 
the state statutes, served as reporter and later as a Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Michigan, was a member of the first faculty of the University of Michigan 
Law School, and was appointed a member and later chairman of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission. His Constitutional Limitations, "the most fecund 
source of laissez faire constitutional principles available during the [post-Civil 
War] period" (p. 30) was published contemporaneously with the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The second, Christopher G. Tiedeman, was successively a member of the 
faculty of the University of Missouri Law School, the law school of the Univer-
sity of the City of New York, and Dean of the law school at the University of 
Buffalo. At the age of twenty-nine he published his Limitations of Police 
Power-a work which, in Mr. Jacobs' opinion, "far more clearly sustained and 
developed laissez faire constitutional principles than did that of Cooley, and 
it was second only to the work of the latter in the influence it was to exercise 
on bench and bar." (pp. 58-59) 
The third, John F. Dillon, was both a physician and a lawyer, a member of 
the Iowa Supreme Court and later United States Judge in Iowa, and still later 
a professor in the Columbia University Law School as well as counsel for the 
Union Pacific Railroad. Best known to most lawyers for his treatise on Munici-
pal Corporations, he is characterized as one of the "foremost spokesmen for 
laissez faire principles." 
Mr. Jacobs concludes that "the works of Cooley and Tiedeman were instru-
mental in the formulation, development, and application of the liberty of con-
tract principle as a limitation upon the police power of the states and the com-
merce power of the national government, and that the treatises of Cooley and 
Dillon were of equal importance in making the public purpose maxim an 
important restriction upon the taxing and spending powers of state and local 
governments." (pp. v-vi) The three commentators selected, "not less than the 
judges and the lawyers, were responsible for the popularization within their 
profession of constitutional principles which encompassed the laissez faire poli-
cies demanded by industrial capitalists." (p. 4) He also concludes that the 
influence of Cooley and Tiedeman was "most pronounced" in cases reviewing 
statutes protecting labor unions, (p. 76) and that by supplying the judiciary 
"with the materials whereby due process of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
given life and whereby the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment was 
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subsequently reanimated, the publicists contributed to a constitutional revolu-
tion paralleling the industrial revolution which was then taking place." (p. 22) 
As a survey of the development of liberty of contract and public purpose 
tax doctrines, especially in state constitutional interpretation, this monograph 
deserves the attention of constitutional lawyers and historians. As a brief for 
the influence which three publicists exercised during the half-century following 
the Civil War, it is not persuasive, for five reasons. 
First, the author requires the reader, in scores of instances throughout the 
book, to accept court citation of a treatise as establishing a cause-and-effect re-
lationship between the cited material and the decision reached. 
Second, the cogency of the influence argument is diminished by the author's 
admission that one of the reasons for the success of Cooley's Constitutional 
Limitations was "the fact that the treatise, as its title indicates, emphasized lim-
itations upon power rather than power itself" and this made it "readily com-
patible with prevailing economic and political ideas of the time." (p. 30) While 
it is possible for works to be "readily compatible" with prevailing ideas and still 
be influential, it is also suggestive that such works are caught in the tide of 
influence stemming from an earlier change of direction in social or economic 
thought. 
Third, an advocate of the Jacobs' position might be troubled by the state-
ment that Cooley's concepts of restraints upon the police power were "enor-
mously suggestive" yet "in many respects, they were somewhat vague." (p. 106) 
Similarly, the author concedes that Cooley's ideas on public purposes for taxation 
were "not altogether consistent" yet they were "warmly received by bench and 
bar." (p. 109) This may indicate Cooley's influence upon the courts, but it is 
at least equally plausible that the ambiguity of Cooley's writings furnished 
convenient receptacles into which the judges might pour their preconceptions 
as to governmental power.1 
Fourth, allegiance to the Jacobs thesis is also thwarted by several deficiencies 
in the internal consistency of his argument. For example, we are told that "much 
of the force and prestige" of Tiedeman's work "undoubtedly derived from its 
logical consistency and rigor." (p. 62) Yet the author announces this conclusion 
almost immediately after pointing out that Tiedeman "rejected the notion that 
the courts could invalidate legislation because they regarded it as contrary to 
principles of natural right and of abstract justice. But the force of this idea 
was almost wholly destroyed by his acceptance, apparently without reservation, 
of the doctrine of implied limitations on legislative power." (p. 60) Similarly, 
the non sequitur of the following statement is apparent: "To a large extent the 
rapid development of laissez faire in the state courts was due to the influence 
1 A similar inference, as to the influence, of Tiedeman, might be drawn from this 
statement. ''When other authorities were lacking on a given proposition of laissez faire or 
when they were hostile to that proposition, the bench and bar might conlidently refer to 
the works of Tiedeman for support. It was in this respect that he made his most notable 
contribution." p. 62. 
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of Cooley, for that writer exercised far greater influence upon those tribunals 
than upon the United States Supreme Court." (p. 49) The fact that Cooley 
exercised less influence upon the United States Supreme Court than upon the 
state courts hardly establishes that the rapid development of laissez faire in the 
latter was "due to the influence of Cooley." 
Fifth, in an effort to accentuate the influence of his three selected writers, 
Mr. Jacobs found it necessary to minimize the importance of other commen-
tators in a way which invites rebuttal. Thus we are told that Ernst Freund's 
Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional Rights "was less original than 
were the works of Cooley and Tiedeman .•. " and "did not become a standard· 
citation in judicial opinions," (p. 94) and that the reliance of state tribunals 
upon the works of Cooley was "unparalleled in American judicial history." (p. 
41) One may doubt whether the author has adequately documented these con-
clusions so as to subordinate to the work of these three men the writings of such 
commentators as Kent and Story. 
Richard. A. Ed.wards, 
Associate Professor of 
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